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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff and
Appellee,

v.
S'rEVEN LEON VILLIARD,

Case No. 12631

Defendant and
Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE AND
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BELOW

Appellant, Steven Leon Villard, is appealing from a conviction of rape under
76-35-15, Utah Code Annotated 1953, rendered
in the Fourth Judicial District Court for
Utah County, the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen
Presiding.

Appellant was tried by jury for

the above crime, found guilty and sentenced

to imprisonment in the Utah State Prison for
a term of not less than ten years.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks an order dismissing the
charges against him or in the alternative an
order remanding the case to the lower court
for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
The appellant was convicted of rape under
@ 76-53-15, Utah Code Annotated 1953, which

provides in essential part as follows:
"Rape is an act of sexual intercourse
accomplished with a female, not the
wife of the perpetrator, under any
of the following circumstances:

* * *
(3)

Where she resists, but her resistance is overcome by force
or violence.

(4)

Where she is prevented from resisting by threats of immediate.
and great bodily harm,
by apparent power of
or by any intoxicating,
or anaesthetic substance administered by or with the privity of
the accused.

-2-

The testimony of Mary Alice Ivie, the
prosccutrix herein, and the appellant are
in conflict and fully discussed in the argument under Point VI.
The following are facts not in controversy.
On May 12, 1971, at approximately 10:45
a.m. the prosecutrix was walking on Creek
Road towards her school, having sometime
earlier that morning not taken the school
bus.

Then or a short time later she volun-

tarily entered appellant's automobile.

The

appellant drove the prosecutrix by her
school and then to an area alleged to be in
Utah County, Utah, near the t( 1.vn of Cedar
Fort.

At that time and location appellant

allegedly raped the prosecutrix.

Thereafter,

the appellcint part of the way and the prosecutr ix most of the way drove themselves
back to the prosecutrix 's school where the
prosecutrix left the appellant's automobile
and entered school at approximately 1:00 p.m.
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the same day.

The· pros,..,

t rix
· th en allegedly

comtJlained of the incident to a friend and
subsequently to school officials.

The ap-

pellant's arrest followed resulting in the
trial below.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
FAILURE OF APPELLANT'S ATTORNEY AT
TRIAL TO TAKE EXCEPTIONS TO INSTRUCTIONS DOES NOT PREVENT REVERSAL
The Utah law on the question of appellate
review of criminal cases where the attorney
representing the appellant at trial did not
request or take exceptions to instructions
has been stated by this court as follows:
"We wish not to depart from the rule
laid down in this jurisdiction that
in ordinary cases on appeal errors
relating to instructions or refusing
requests to instruct will not be
considered or reviewed unless exceptions thereto were properly taken
by tlie party complaining. But in
capital cases and in cases of grave
and serious charged offenses and convictions of long terms of imprisonment cases involving the life and
of the citizen, we think that

-4-

when palpable error is made to appear
on
face of the record and to the
manifest prejudice of the accused
the court has the power to notice such
error and to correct the same, though
no formal exception was taken to the
ruling."
State v. Cobo,90 Utah 89,
60 P.2d 952, 958 (1936).
1

"Nor is it always the duty of the court
to instruct on the lesser offenses,-for example, where either a conviction
or outright acquittal of a particular
offense is mandatory, leaving no room
to hold an accused for any other offense.
Nor must the court always
instruct as to lesser offenses whether
requested so to do or not.

* * *
"The great weight of authority is to
the effect that if no request is made
for instructions on lesser offenses,
and none is given, such failure to
instruct is not reviewable as a matter
of right on appeal." State v. Mitchell,
3 Utah 2d 70, 278 P.2d 618, 621 (1955).
It has been applied to the failure to
make objections to evidence in a rape case
as follows:
"The errors assigned relate to claimed
improper admission of evidence. Through
counsel on appeal, who did not represent him at the trial, defendant concedes that no proper objections were made
to some of the testimony in question.
Under those circumstances, giving
sideration to such matters on appeal is
-5-

done rarely and with caution in an awareness of the importance of the requirement
for timely objections. This serves to
safeguard correct rulings when made;
and to prevent any deliberate delay in
making objections to later take advantage
of errors committed. However, so long
as these factors are given due consideration, we do not disagree with the defendant's contention that in serious criminal
cases, under special circumstances, where
the interests of justice so require, this
court may notice palpable and significant
error even though proper objections were
not taken at the trial." State v. Sanchez,
11 Utah 2d 429, 361 P.2d 174, 175 (1961).
In the instant case the appellant was
tried for a serious crime punishable by
depriving him of his freedom for a period of
not less than ten years and a maximum period
of the duration of his life.

The errors

committed in the trial below, both singularly
and in combined effect, are significant and
substantially deprivedappellant of a fair
trial and due process of law.

Where the in-

structions are palpably erroneous to such
an extent, if followed by tl1G jury, they
would prevent a fair determination of the
case, this court should notice the error
without exceptions having been taken.

-6-

So far as the record shows none of the
errors herein were invited by appellant.
Appellant requested no instructions and
took no exception to the instructions
given. (R. 39).
The errors in the instructions of which
appellant now complains are each treated
separately in the following arguments as
though each was itself reversible error.
In applying the above

rule as to whether

this court should review the instructions,
the entire case should be considered to determine if appellant in fact received a
fair trial on the issues.
POINT II
THE COURT'S FAILURE TO INSTRUCT THE
JURY ON LESSER AND INCLUDED OFFENSES
IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE IS
REVERSIBLE ERROR
This court has held that it is reversible error for the trial court to fail to
instruct the jury on finding the defendant
of a lesser and included offense where
..,

tho evidence would justify such a conviction.
Stotc v. Hyams, 64 Utah 285, 230 Pac. 349
(1924); State v. Barkas, 91 Utah 574, 65 P.2d
1130 (1934).

Where the evidence was over-

whelming that the defendant committed the
act charged and there was no evidence justifying a conviction of a lesser offense this
court has held that it is not reversible
error to fail to instruct the jury concerning the lesser offense.

State v. Gleason,

17 Utah 2d 149, 405 P.2d 793 (1965).

In

State v. Gleason, supra, there was no conflict in the testimony as the defendant did
not testify in his own behalf.
Hymas, supra,

In State v.

this court stated that not

instructing on lesser offenses should be
done only in very clear cases.
supra, contra.

State v.

In State v. Barkas,

supra, it was reversible error not to instruct
on the lesser offense where the evidence of
the lesser offense was from the testimony
of the state's witness and the evidence on
the greater offense from the testimony of
the defendant.

In the present case there is direct
conflict in the testimony of the prosecutrix
and the appellant and the jury could have
believed part or all of the testimony of
either.

By believing anything less than

all of the prosecutrix's testimony, the jury
might have found the appellant guilty of
attempted rape or assault with intent to
commit rape, if they had been so instructed.
No instructions were given on the lesser
offenses and the jury was given no opportunity to return a verdict that the appellant
was guilty of these offenses.

Depriving the

defendant of having these matters determined

by the jury is reversible error.
POINT III
THE COURT BELOW COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE J1JRY
THAT THE LACK OF CONSENT OF THE PROSECUTRIX WAS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE
CRIME ALLEGED
The court gave no instruction on the jury's
finding that the prosecutrix did not consent
to the alleged sexual intercourse.

_q_

The lack

of consent is an essential element of the
crime of rape.

44 Am. Jur. 906, Rape SB;

75 C.J.S. 473, Rape 811.

Appellant was en-

titled to an instruction that the jury should
acquit him unless the State had proven beyond
a reasonable doubt that the prosecutrix had

not consented to the act of sexual intercourse.

75 C.J.S. 577, Rape S 82c.

There is sub-

stantial evidence of the consent of the
prosecutrix to the sexual act.

Appellant

testified that the incident with the prosecutrix, although not involving intercourse,
was with the mutual consent of both parties.
(Tr. 61)

The jury could have believed the

appellant's testimony that any incident with
the prosecutrix was with her consent.

The

prosecutrix testified that she accepted money
from the appellant.

(Tr. 14)

Accepting

money may not establish consent by itself,
but it is evidence thereof from which the
jury could have found the consent of the
prosecu tr ix.
The state established by uncontradicted
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evidence that the prosecutrix was fourteen
years of age at the time of the alleged act.
(Tr. 5)

With other proper instructions the

State might have obtained a conviction under
S 76-53-19, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
tory rape).

(statu-

Because of the age of the

prosecutrix, her consent is not an essential
element of that crime.

The elimination of

the element of consent for conviction of
statutory rape does not apply to a charge
under

§

76-53-15 where the state is required

to prove, and the jury must find, lack of
consent by the prosecutrix inspite of her age
and inability to give legal consent.

The

jury was not so instructed and that is reversible error.
POINT IV
THE COURT BELOW COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN NOT GIVING A PRECAUTIONARY
INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY CONCERNING
THE APPELLANT ON THE TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTRIX
There is a split of authority on whether
the defendant in a rape case is entitled to
-11-

a precautionary instruction with regard to
the prosecutrix's testimony.
Rape

123.

44 A· m. Jur. 979,

This court has held that the fail-

ure to give a precautionary instruction in a
rape case is reversible error.

State v.

Scott, 55 Utah 553, 188 Pac. 860 (1920).

In

the Scott case, supra, this court stated as
follows:
"It is then pointed out that the prosecutrix necessarily has a greater interest in the result of the case than a
disinterested witness would have, and
that the jury should be instructed to
consider and weigh her testimony with
that fact in mind. Indeed, it should
require no argument to show that the
prosecutrix, under circumstances like
those disclosed by this record, is vitally interested in the result of the
case. Her future reputation to a large
extent may be affected by the result,
say nothing about the fact that she has
a vital interest in vindicating herself
and the attitude she has assumed respecting the prosecution. The jury
should therefore be plainly told that
they
consider and weigh the testimony of the prosecutrix in view
her
interest in the result and also in connection with and in the light of all the
other evidence in the case, including
all the facts and circumstances as they
appear from the evidence, and if
considering and weighing her
in the light aforesaid they are satis-
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f ied beyond a reasonable doubt and
have an abiding conviction that all
of
elements of the crime charged
against the defendant have been thus
established, they may find him guilty
upon her testimony alone.
In this
jursidiction, where no corroboration
of the statements of the prosecutrix
is necessary to convict, it is of the
utmost importance that the jury be
carefully instructed with regard to
how her testimony should be considered
and weighed; and that is especially
true where, as here, her testimony
stands practically alone, and must be
taken as against what, judging from
the record, seems to us to be strong
countervailing evidence."

State v. Scott, supra, at Utah 569-70,
Pac. 86 7.

In State v. Rutledge, 63 Utah 546,

227 Pac. 479 (1924)

this court held the

refusal to give a precautionary instruction was not error where there was corroboration of the prosecutrix's testimony, consent
was not an issue and the trial court properly
advised the jury of "their right to consider
the bias interest, or motive of any witness".
.

I

In this case appellant was convicted on
the sole and uncorroborated testimony of the
prosecutrix.

Consent, although there was

-13-

the testimony of the prosecutrix exactly
like that of any other witness in the case.
This is exactly the situation considered
by this court in the Scott case , supra,

and

held to be reversible error.
POINT V
IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE THE
FAILURE OF THE COURT TO INSTRUCT THE
JURY CONCERNING THE USE OF THE APPELLANT'S TESTIMONY OF HIS PRIOR CONVIC.TION OF A FELONY IS ERROR
Appellant was placed in the position
of either not testifying as to his version
of the incident with the prosecutrix or
testifying and having disclosed to the jury
the fact that he had been previously convicted
of a felony and that felony was for attempted
rape.

Appellant elected to testify and the

trial court allowed cross-examination as to
the nature of the felony of which the appellant was convicted.

The case was already

incipited with passion and prejudice against
appellant because of the age of the prosecu-
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trix and his admitted conduct with her.

In

these circumstances, appellant was entitled
to have the evidence limited when introduced
and to an instruction that his testimony on
this matter bears only on his credibility as
a witness and is not probative of the question
of his guilt in this case.

Appellant did not

request such an instruction or take exception
to the instructions given.

In State v.

Peterson,121 Utah 229, 240 P.2d 504 (1952)
this court has held that it will not reverse
a conviction where such an instruction was
not given and not requested.

In that case,

however, the subject instruction was the
only omitted instruction claimed as error.
In the instant case, the failure to give this
instruction together with the failure to
give the instructions heretofore discussed
and the potential prejudice involved in the
case results in appellant's having been deprived of a fair trial and is reversible
error.

-16-

POINT VI
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT TIIE
VERDICT OF '1 HE JURY
1

The appellant was charged and convicted
of the crime of rape requiring the jury to
find beyond a reasonabe doubt that all elements of that crime had been committed by
the appellant.

The only witnesses for the

State were Mary Alice Ivie, the prosecutrix
herein, Miss Dawn Aoki, a fourteen year old
friend of the prosecutrix, Deputy Sheriff
John R. Llewelyn and Deputy Sheriff Mack
Holley.

John R. Llewelyn testified to the

area shown to him by the prosecutrix as where

the crime allegedly occurred (Tr. 43-53,
69-71)

and identified certain pictures

marked as Exhibits 3, 4 and 5 obtained from
the defendant upon his arrest.
53)

(Tr. 42-3,

Mack Holley testified to the area shown

to him by the prosecutrix as where the crime
allegedly occurred.

(Tr. 54-87)

The only attempt to corroborate the
testimony of the prosecutrix was by the
testimony of Miss Dawn Aoki.
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Corroboration

of a prosecutrix's testimony need not establish or tend to establish all of the
essential acts of the crime of rape but it
must be sufficient to show that a crime in
fact was committed.

The State's attempt

to corroborate the prosecutrix's testimony
through the testimony of Miss Aoki fails.
The State failed to ask Miss Aoki of what
the prosecutrix had complained to her.

The

record shows the following:
"Q.

Then where did you go?

A.

We went out into the hall to our
lockers and then started out to our
6th period class.

Q.

Did you have a conversation with Mary
at that time?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Then answer this yes or no: Did
she tell you what had happened?

A.

Yes.

Q.

All right.
Then what did you do
after that?

A.

After she was through telling the
story?

Q.

Yes."

(Tr. 3 9)

-18-

'l'ltere lS

no further testimony concerning what

the rrosecutrix told Miss Aoki.

From the

state of this record there is no corroboration that the prosecutrix told her that she
had been raped.

The testimony of Miss Aoki

is as consistent with the prosecutrix having
told her she was hit by an automobile on
the way to school, or had just returned from
playing around with a man, as that she had
been raped.

The failure of the State to

pursue this questioning might be construed
as misinterpretation of the law as described
by this court in State v. Christensen, 73
Utah 575, 276 Pac. 163, 165 (1929) as follows:
"It undoubtedly was competent to give
testimony that the prosecutrix complained of an injury or outrage inflicted
upon her and the nature and character
ot it where and when it occurred, and
that
one forcibly and against her
will and consent had sexual intercourse with her, had ravished her."
However,

in view of the fact the State

failed to call any other witness to corrobor-19-

ate the complaint of the prose cu tr ix and the

fact the record as it stands indicates that

at least one teacher was told the story by
the prosecutrix and at least one other observed the condition of the prosecutrix
does not justify a presumption in favor of
the State that such omission was by inadvertance.

The other potential witnesses not

called by the State would be persons trained
or at least experienced in determining the
veracity of a complaint or possible complaint
made to them by a fourteen year old.

The

failure of the State to call these witnesses
to prove the prosecutrix's complaint is
fairly a presumption that whatever evidence
such witness would have given would have
been unfavorable to the case of the State.
of the lack of corroboration
of the prosecutrix's complaint, this court has
held that a defendant may be convicted of

the crime of rape on the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutrix.

-20-

State v. Horne, 12

Utilh 2d 162,

364 P.2d 109 (1961).

In cases

found by appellant's counsel, this court has
not confirmed a conviction based on the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutrix.
E.g., State v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 34, 347
P.2d 865

(1959), medical evidence of force-

able intercourse; State v. Glispy, 10 Utah 2d
13, 347 P.2d 562

(1959), medical testimony;

State v. Montgomery, 37 Utah 515, 109 P. 815
(1910) , prosecutrix was pregnant.
The prosecutrix's testimony is substantially that while she was walking to school
on Creek Road she first saw the appellant
when he asked her for directions to the water
treatment plant in the area.

The appellant

then offered her a ride to school which she
declined and the appellant left (Tr. 5, 6).
She next saw the appellant parker1 on the
opposite side of Oak Crest Drive about eight
or ten minutes later when she was walking to
school.

(Tr. 7, 27)

The appellant again

offered her a ride to school and she volun-

21

turily accepted the ride, knowing that he
WilS

alone in the car.

(Tr. 7)

The appellant

then asked her if she knew a named individual
who w0s cousin of his and she said that the
person was a neighbor of hers.

(Tr. 8)

The

appellant then drove her by her school and
grabbed the back of her hair and told her to
get down on the floor, threatening physical
violence.

The appellant continued to drive

until they reached the Canyon Inn at which
time he ordered her to get on the seat and
tied her hands behind her back with a strap
from her purse and gagged her by stuffing
one of her socks in her mouth and tying the
other around her head.

(Tr. 8-10)

Appellant

then ordered her back down on the floor where
the prosecutrix stayed while the defendant
drove to the location of the alleged act in
Utah county.

While driving, the defendant

threatened the prosecutrix, ordered her to
turn over and when she could not, pushed her
over on her stomach and fondled her over sub-

-22-

stantially her entire body.

(Tr. 11)

Upon

at the alleged area the appellant
untied her hands and removed the gag and

after ordering her to engage in some preliminary sexual activities, ordered her to

get into the back seat where the sexual
intercourse allegedly took place.
13)

(Tr. 12-

The appellant then drove from the loca-

tion to somewhere on Redwood Road where he
appeared to be getting sick and he let the
prosecutrix drive his car from that point
back to her school and in effect giving her
a driving lesson on the way.

The appellant

and prosecutrix engaged in conversation including a description of the appellant's
family,

the showing of pictures, the giving

to her of $20.00 and the borrowing back of
her lunch money so that he could buy some
cigarettes.

When the prosecutrix arrived

back at her school she started crying, left
her class and told her friend, Dawn Aoki,
what had happened.

She and her friend were

-23-

dismissed from class and at the suggestion
of her friend,

she told a teacher, Mrs.

Doggcss, what had happened.

(Tr. 13-17, 26)

The appellant's testimony is substantially
in conflict with the prosecutrix's testimony.
The appellant testified that he on a local
business trip, picked up the prosecutrix as
she was thumbing a ride.

As he was driving

her to school they engaged in friendly conversation and mutually decided to take a ride
out towards Utah Lake.
tion continued.

The friendly conversa-

They reached a spot in Tooele

County where they stopped and necked and the
prosccutrix acted like she wanted sex.
After they both disrobed, she appeared that
she did not want to do anything more so they
put their clothes back on and started on the
return trip to Sandy.

The subject of money

was discussed and the appellant gave the
prosecutrix $20.00.

The appellant let the

prosecutrix drive most of the way back to
her school in Sandy where she left him.
(Tr. 59-62)

-24-

In considering the sufficiency of the
evidence, the total picture as presented by
the record must be kept in mind in evaluating
the result reached by the Jury.

In the

instant case the prosecutrix's testimony is
so palatally unblievable and contradictory
it is not sufficient to support the verdict.
From the prosecutrix's own testimony it
is unquestioned that she was truant from
school at the time of the alleged crime.
She testified that her mother was not at home
and that she had stayed home to finish some
assignments from school.

Favoring the pro-

secutrix' s story that she was enticed into
the appellant's automobile by his first
asking her directions to the water treatment
plant in the area and then subsequently,
after that purported introduction, offering
to give her a ride, rather than her thumbing
a ride, hurts the prosecutrix's story.

It

shows an intent from the beginning to perpetrate

some offense against the prosecu-

-25-

tr ix.

The appellant identified himself to

her by asking her if she knew by name a
cousin of his who was a neighbor of hers.
This hardly appears the type of admission a
person intent upon rape would immediately
tell his potential victim.
On cross examination the prosecutrix
testified when being probed concerning
whether or not the appellant attempted to
hide his identity from her as follows:
"One time he said that he would rather
not tell me. As we were driving out
he said he would rather not tell me and
then he said that his name was Steve." (Tr.2
Interestingly, the prosecutrix had previously
testified that she was gagged while they
were driving out to the area where the act
allegedly occurred.

The prosecutrix testi-

fied that she undid the appellant's pants
(Tr. 12)

and later on testified that he un-

zipped them himself.

(Tr. 17)

In addition,

the physical activities of the parties while
the appellant was driving appear from
common sense improbable.
-26-

Even more im-

[ll

ubLJblc is the fr icndly conduct on the

return trip.
Significant in examining the prosecutrix's testimony is what the State failed to
attempt to prove.

The State did not intro-

duce any medical evidence that the prosecuLrix had been bruised or otherwise injured
or had had sexual intercourse.

The State did

not introduce any physical evidence of the
act which allegedly occurred on the back seat
of def enc;<::tu t' s car at a time when the prosecutrix was in her period giving rise to a
reasonable assumption that if the act had in
fact occurred there would have been physical
evidence of it in the

car.

The

State did not produce testimony or even ask
Miss Aoki if she saw the defendant after the
incident with the strap torn off her purse.
In addition I

as stated before, the State

failed to corroborate the prosecutrix's
alleged complaint by any adult witness which
Witnesses were unquestionable available.
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Jn addition the State's evidence from the
testimony of the prosecutrix is insufficient

to support the finding of the verdict beyond
a reasonable doubt.

On direct examination

the prosecutrix testified to the facts indieating sexual intercourse and penetration.

On further direct examination the record
reveals the following:

"Q.

All right. Are you sure that he did
have intercourse with you?

A"

Yes.

Q.

How do you know?

A.

I could--I don't know.

Q"

It hurt there?

A.

Yes.

11

It hurt me.

(Tr. 17)

'I'he State itself introduced from the prosecutrix reasonable doubt concerning the act of
sexual intercourse and it was incumbent on
the State to purrue this line of questioning
to resolve the issue.

In addition, a review

of the entire record fails to show that the
State ever asked the prosecutrix if she consented to whatever was done.
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The appellant's story is nothing to brag
about, but it is consistent with all evidence

in the record except the testimony of the
prosecutrix and the torn purse strap which

was in the prosecutrix's possession.

It is

consistent with the State's failure to prove

the previously mentioned items. And when
coupled with the age of the defendant it is
a story that would cause the jury to be

guided by passion and prejudice in determining the possible guilt of the appellant.
A careful evaluation of the entire record shows the testimony of the prosecutrix
is so inherently improbable as to be unworthy
of belief and that reasonable persons could
not find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant did rape the prosecutrix.
CONCLUSION
Appellant is entitled to have his conviction vacated and the case remanded with directions to dismiss the charge against the
appellant or in the alternative to have the
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case remanded for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
CLARK P. GILES
Attorney for Appellant
400 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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